The roster is almost entirely inside the state and the village. The municipal party committee and government wrote the 2008 decision and the fund rules; the municipal and county budgets pay, and a county that fails to match its share has the money deducted by the municipal finance bureau at settlement (Wang). Townships review and ratify the project lists, hold the village accounts and coordinate works (Zhuang, Wang). Inside the village the party secretary convenes and chairs the council and the branch screens agendas (Zhuang; Jiang and Huang); the council of elected, unpaid villagers decides; the elected village committee runs the household survey and executes decisions; 5 to 7 elected members form the oversight and finance groups. The one standing civil-society partner is the HuiZhi Participation Center (Zhuang Ming's NGO, renamed Social Equity and Participation Center by 2024), which collects project data, documented the case for the 2018 report and ran the 2021 experiment on the ground; its access was granted by the party committee on urban-rural coordination (Zhuang 2014 acknowledgement). Scholars at the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences (Li Ling) advised the 2009 design (Frenkiel). Third-party builders, tender agents and auditors entered as a required role once projects above 100,000 yuan had to be tendered (Chen Yiyuan, 2018). Villagers with trade skills act as local experts assessing proposals (Zhuang). Li Chuncheng, Chengdu's party secretary, decided to formalise the scheme in 2009 (Frenkiel; Jiang and Huang quote his speeches); no source names a champion after him. Commitment levels are left blank where no source describes the instrument.